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Abstract
Recent models of prosociality suggest that cooperation in laboratory games may be better un-
derstood as resulting from concern for social norms than from prosocial preferences over out-
comes. Underlying this interpretation is the idea that people exhibit heterogeneous respect
for shared norms. We introduce a new, abstract task to elicit a proxy for individual norm-
following propensity by asking subjects to choose from two actions, where one is costly. We
instruct subjects that “the rule is” to take the costly action. Their willingness to incur such
a cost reveals respect for norms. We show that choices in this task are similar across five
countries. Rule-following is correlated with norm-consistent behavior in dictator games, pro-
viding support for our interpretation.
JEL classifications: C91, D03
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1 Introduction
We present a new method for measuring the propensity to adhere to social norms, a propensity
which parameterizes many recent models of prosocial behavior (Cappelen et al., 2007; López-
Pérez, 2008; Kessler and Leider, 2012; Krupka and Weber, 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov,
2016). In such models, individuals evaluate the appropriateness of own behavior by compar-
ing it to exogenously defined and commonly known injunctive social norms, that is, to a set of
shared beliefs about the appropriateness of possible actions available in the setting. Each possi-
ble action has both direct payoff consequences and a normative valence, which enter additively
in the utility function. Social norms are assumed to vary with context, and when norms and self-
interest conflict, individuals face a trade-off between following the norm and maximizing their
payoff. Crucially, individuals may differ in the degree to which they suffer from norm violations
(or gain from norm adherence). This can be captured in a single parameter that assigns a weight
to the normative component of utility. Thus, heterogeneous behavior within a given game can
be explained via heterogeneity in these weights, while heterogeneous behavior across games, or
across contexts, can be explained by the fact that norms vary with the setting.1 In order to cor-
rectly account for both effects, it is, therefore, necessary to separately measure normative beliefs
and norm-following propensity, since social behavior deviating from payoff maximization is a
joint product of both norms and the weight assigned to them.
The task we introduce is a variant of the rule-following task used in Kimbrough and Vostroknu-
tov (2015, 2016), in which subjects’ willingness to follow an experimenter-stated rule at personal
cost provides a measure of norm-following propensity. The new task is abstract unlike its pre-
decessor, which embedded measurement of norm-following in a traffic light context. It thus
facilitates empirical testing of the social norms hypothesis across diverse social environments,
where some norms (e.g., traffic conventions) are likely to vary substantially. We have conducted
a number of experiments that included this task in five countries (Canada, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Turkey, USA). We observe similarly-shaped distributions of norm-following propensity
across countries. Moreover, in some countries (Canada, the Netherlands, and USA), we also
subsequently collected data in a variant of the Dictator game, while in the other two countries
subjects made other social decisions which plausibly have normative valence. Our findings
broadly support the norm-driven social behavior hypothesis and demonstrate that the new task
offers a portable method of eliciting individual-level respect for social norms across cultures and
experiments.
1Norm-dependent preferences were introduced, in part, to help account for such “context effects,” which cannot
be easily rationalized in typical social preference models where utility is defined only over payoffs.
1
2 The Rule-Following Task
In the rule-following task participants drag-and-drop balls one-by-one into two buckets: yellow
or blue. For each ball in the yellow bucket they receive 10 cents and for each ball in the blue
bucket they receive 5 cents (see Figure 1). The current earnings from the two buckets are shown
above them. The total earnings in this task is the sum of earnings from the buckets. The position
of the buckets on the screen is randomized across individuals.
Figure 1: Presentation of the rule-following task.
The instructions explicitly state that “the rule is to put the balls into the blue bucket” (see Ap-
pendix C). Participants have a fixed number of balls to allocate (say 100); thus, their earnings
can vary from $5, if they follow the rule to the letter, to $10, if they break the rule with each
ball.2 Across a variety of experiments we have elicited rule-following task behavior from 1,090
subjects.
3 How to Use the Rule-Following Task
As Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2016), we use the cost incurred following the rule as a measure
of an individual’s propensity to follow norms in other environments. For intuition, consider a
norm-dependent utility of subject i in the rule-following task. Suppose, for simplicity, that the
blue bucket gives $0 and the yellow bucket $1 for each ball. Assume i gets linear consumption
utility from money and incurs costs from not following the norm. The costs are higher the fewer
balls are in the blue bucket. The utility from having x balls in the yellow bucket can be written
as follows:
Ui(x) = x + φig(x).
2When subjects ask for clarification about the statement that “the rule is. . . ”, we always answered that “this is the
rule of the experiment,” and when they ask whether anything will happen to them if they don’t follow the rule, we
told them that all information they need to make their decision is in the instructions.
2
Here φi ≥ 0 is the propensity of i to follow norms and g : R+ → [−1, 1] is a function that
assigns a normative social appropriateness (or inappropriateness) to each action x.3 Function g(x)
is assumed to capture the unique norm shared by all members of the society which, importantly,
is assumed to be independent from individual parameter φi.
In the rule-following task g(x) is decreasing in x. Suppose that subject i maximizes her util-
ity. Then, given appropriate assumptions on the shape of g(x), we would have the following
equation φi = −1/g′(x∗), where x∗ is the optimal choice (observed by us in the experiment).
Thus, we obtain a positive monotonic relationship between unobserved φi and observed x∗. In
this sense we consider the observations in the rule-following task as a proxy for φi.
Consider now a Dictator who keeps x dollars in the Dictator game and has the same norm-
dependent utility Ui(x). The only difference is that now g(x) reflects the social appropriateness
of action x in the Dictator game. The social appropriateness of each action can be directly mea-
sured using the norm elicitation task introduced in Krupka and Weber (2013), which uses a
coordination game to measure beliefs about norms.4 Figure 2 illustrates.
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Figure 2: Elicited norms in the dictator game (US/Canadian data, N = 88, from Kimbrough et al.
(2017)). Bars indicate ±1 SE.
The “very socially inappropriate” rating corresponds to g(x) = −1 and “very socially appro-
priate” rating to g(x) = 1. One can see that giving half in the Dictator game is considered highly
appropriate and giving nothing is thought highly inappropriate. Thus, norm-dependent utility
maximizers with high φi should tend to choose closer to the half/half distribution and utility
maximizers with low φi should choose closer to keeping the entire pie.
3When defining norms for games it is crucial that g(x) is a function defined on the action space and not on the
outcome space, which coincide in case of the rule-following task and the Dictator game, but not in general.
4Evidence suggests that subjects perceive a consistent injunctive norm (on average) when they are asked to
identify the norm from the perspective of second- and third-parties (Erkut et al., 2015).
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4 Results
4.1 Rule-Following in Five Countries
Figure 3 shows the distributions of rule-following in the Netherlands, USA, Canada, Turkey, and
Italy. Appendix B reports descriptive statistics. Strikingly, all distributions have point masses at
full rule-following and full rule-breaking, though the heights of these peaks differ somewhat (a
Kruskal-Wallis test on the five samples gives p = 0.012). Pairwise comparisons via Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests, corrected for multiple comparisons, reveal significant differences only between
the USA and Canada, and the USA and Turkey. In Appendix B we report regression analysis of
rule-following in which we explore whether demographic differences (conditional on country)
can account for these observations and find limited evidence. Overall, the task appears quite
portable across countries.
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Figure 3: Rule-following propensity (percentage of balls in blue bucket) in five countries. Num-
ber of observations: 44 in the Netherlands; 354 in USA; 238 in Canada; 336 in Turkey; 118 in
Italy; 1,090 overall.
4.2 Rule-Following and Behavior in the Dictator Game
Next we report correlations between rule-following task and Dictator game choices (see Ap-
pendix A for the details of the Dictator game design). In all sessions that also contained a Dicta-
tor game, the rule-following task was presented first. In the pooled data from USA, Canada, and
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the Netherlands Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the amount sent to the recipi-
ent and the share of balls placed into the blue (costly) bucket is highly significant and positive
(ρ = 0.31, p < 0.0001, N = 180). This result is much stronger than the analogous correlation
(ρ = 0.191, p = 0.061, N = 67) reported in Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2016) where the
rule-following task involving traffic lights was used.
When we analyze the data within-country, we find a strong correlation between behavior
in the rule-following task and Dictator game choices in the Netherlands and USA, but not in
Canada. Spearman’s correlation coefficient in the Netherlands is ρ = 0.42, (p = 0.006, N = 44);
in the USA: ρ = 0.51, (p < 0.0001, N = 70), and in Canada: ρ = 0.06, (p = 0.62, N = 66). We
regress the difference between the amount sent and the equal split on rule-following, country
dummies and interactions to further support these findings (Table 1). Wald tests reveal that
the coefficient on rule-following is significant in the Netherlands (β = −0.151, p = 0.035) and
the USA (β = −0.171, p < 0.001), but not in Canada (β = −0.078, p = 0.251), though the
coefficient has the predicted sign. Moreover, in the USA the subjects give slightly less overall
(β = 0.087, p = 0.068).
Distance of the amount sent
from equal split norm
RF –0.138*** –0.151**
(0.033) (0.071)
USA 0.073** 0.087*
(0.034) (0.048)
USA × RF –0.020
(0.083)
CAN 0.018 –0.024
(0.038) (0.060)
CAN × RF 0.073
(0.098)
constant 0.363*** 0.368***
(0.031) (0.040)
N 180 180
Table 1: OLS regression of sharing in the Dictator game. Errors are robust. Significance:
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
Similar patterns are found in Turkish and Italian samples where different games were cou-
pled with the rule-following task. In Italy subjects chose in a series of mini-Dictator games
which consisted of a choice between two allocations with constant sum of payoffs. The av-
erage number of non-selfish choices (when a subject chooses an allocation that gives her less
money than the alternative) correlates with the measure of rule-following: Spearman’s ρ = 0.41,
p < 0.0001, N = 118 (Panizza et al., 2017). In Turkey subjects were repeatedly choosing an
amount of tax to contribute to a common pool that was equally redistributed among them
(without enforcement or punishment, but with an explicitly stated non-binding rule that they
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should contribute all their income to the tax). The rule-following propensity is correlated with
the average amount contributed in the late periods even after experiencing a lot of free-riding:
Spearman’s ρ = 0.22, p = 0.0126, N = 128 (Gürdal et al., 2017).
Significant correlations between the rule-following task and various second-stage designs
reported above, thus, allow us to conclude that the task is portable across different experiments
and is not only limited to Dictator games.
4.3 Independence of Rule-Following Behavior and Normative Beliefs
Our data facilitates a test of the as-yet untested assumption that subjects’ rule-following propen-
sities (φi) and elicited normative beliefs (g(x)) are independent, which underlies simple models
of norm-dependent utility. The subjects, whose norm elicitation data were presented in Figure
2, also completed the rule-following task, so we can compare rule-followers’ beliefs to rule-
breakers’ beliefs. Figure 4 shows elicited norms separately for rule-followers and rule-breakers
(split by the median rule-following). The data reveal common agreement that the equal split
is most appropriate and selfishness is inappropriate. However, rank-sum tests show signifi-
cant differences in normative evaluations of five dictator actions (from giving nothing to giv-
ing almost half), with rule-breakers rating these actions less inappropriate than rule-followers
(p = 0.048, p = 0.001, p < 0.001, p < 0.001, p = 0.016, respectively). This suggests that rule-
followers and rule-breakers agree on the content but not necessarily on the strength of the norm.
One plausible interpretation is a self-serving bias among rule-breakers who deem less gener-
ous actions more socially appropriate than rule-followers in order to rationalize their selfishness
(Di Tella et al., 2015).
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Figure 4: Elicited norms in the Dictator game for rule-followers and rule-breakers. Bars indicate
±1 SE. Significance of rank-sum tests: ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
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If φi and g(x) are not always (or fully) independent, one solution is eliciting norms, norm-
following propensity, and behavior in the relevant game within-subjects (D’Adda et al., 2016;
Thomsson and Vostroknutov, 2017). Such data also facilitates more sophisticated analysis than
when norms and behavior are elicited from different subjects.
5 Conclusion
We introduce a new rule-following task for eliciting individual propensity to follow social norms
that is designed to be portable across cultures and experiments. We see similarly-shaped distri-
butions of rule-following across five countries and observe a correlation between the elicited
norm-following propensity and prosocial (norm-consistent) behavior in four out of five coun-
tries, suggesting that the task serves its purpose. Choices in this task are better predictors of
norm-consistent behavior in Dictator games than the original rule-following task in Kimbrough
and Vostroknutov (2016). We thus suggest that researchers seeking a method of measuring
norm-following use this one. Finally, our data also facilitate a test of the assumption that norm-
following propensity and normative beliefs are independent; we find some evidence that the
strength, but not the content, of normative beliefs is correlated with norm-following propensity.
7
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tions, in preparation, Boğaziçi University and University of Trento.
KESSLER, J. B. and LEIDER, S. (2012). Norms and contracting. Management Science, 58 (1), 62–77.
KIMBROUGH, E. O., MILLER, J. B. and VOSTROKNUTOV, A. (2017). Norms, frames and prosocial
behavior in games, mimeo.
— and VOSTROKNUTOV, A. (2015). The social and ecological determinants of common pool
resource sustainability. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 72, 38–53.
— and — (2016). Norms make preferences social. Journal of the European Economic Association,
14 (3), 608–638.
KRUPKA, E. L. and WEBER, R. A. (2013). Identifying social norms using coordination games:
Why does dictator game sharing vary? Journal of the European Economic Association, 11 (3),
495–524.
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Appendix (for online publication)
A The Dictator Game
In some experiments, a Dictator game was played after the rule-following task. A visually and
structurally similar two buckets design was used (Figure 5). Subjects chose whether to put the
balls in their “own” bucket or the bucket of “another player.” The difference between the Dutch
version and the US/Canadian version of the Dictator game was that in the Dutch version the
buckets were originally empty, and the subjects had to make a choice to which bucket to put each
of the 100 balls. In the US version, the buckets were filled with an equal number of balls and
subjects had to decide for each ball whether to keep it in the bucket where it began or to move it
to (“give to” or “take from”) another bucket. All subjects made choices as if they were dictators,
but subjects were randomly paired and half of the decisions were implemented. Instructions
are available in the Appendix. In total we have 180 dictator observations (44 NDL, 70 USA, 66
CAN); this task was always performed immediately after the rule-following task, so that we can
test the model.
Figure 5: Presentation of the dictator game (USA and Canada).
1
B Demographics
In this appendix we explore the connection between our behavioral measures and various de-
mographic characteristics. Table B1 shows summary statistics of the demographic data.1 The
samples are relatively similar in age, percentage of males and years of study, with the Dutch
students having slightly fewer years at University on average. Also, though Economics and
related fields are the most common in all five countries, the US sample has fewer other Social
Science students and somewhat more in the Arts and Humanities. The Italian sample has the
highest percentage of Social Sciences and the lowest share of students studying Natural Sciences.
Self-reported ethnic composition varies widely across the samples, with the Dutch sample being
mostly composed of Europeans, the American sample mostly composed of whites and “Ameri-
cans,” and the Canadian sample divided roughly 1/3 to 2/3 between “Canadians” and Asians.
The Italian sample is composed almost exclusively of Italians, and the Turkish sample is com-
posed entirely of Turks.
Full RF Sample DG Sample
NDL USA CAN TUR ITA NDL USA CAN
Num. Subjects 44 354 238 336 118 44 70 66
rule-following 44.5% 58.5% 54.8% 52.0% 60.1% 44.5% 60.3% 61.2%
Dictator Giving 19.9% 18.8% 22.7%
Demographics
Males 52.3% 57.6% 55.0% 56.6% 47.4% 52.3% 58.6% 57.6%
Years of Study 2.11 2.76 2.80 2.94 2.11 2.63 2.70
Age 21.75 21.77 21.84 21.35 22.36 21.75 21.44 22.08
Field of Study
Economics/Business 63.6% 58.2% 38.7% 38.4% 50.0% 63.6% 58.6% 39.4%
Social Sciences 15.9% 5.9% 19.3% 34.7% 15.9% 10.0% 4.5%
Arts & Humanities 9.1% 13.0% 8.4% 5.1% 9.1% 10.0% 9.1%
Natural Sciences 11.4% 22.6% 32.8% 7.6% 11.4% 21.4% 45.5%
Other 61.6% 1.7% 11.4% 21.4% 45.5%
Ethnicity
“American” 48.6% 1.7% 44.3%
“Canadian” 0.3% 30.3% 22.3%
White/European 88.6% 24.6% 5.5% 100% 88.6% 27.1% 4.5%
Hispanic 6.0% 1.7% 8.6% 3.0%
Black 7.3% 1.3% 7.1%
Asian 11.4% 13.0% 58.8% 100% 11.4% 12.9% 70.0%
Table B1: Summary statistics of behavioral and demographic data.
Table B2 shows an OLS regression of the (normalized) number of balls in the blue bucket
(i.e. the extent of rule-following) regressed on economics/business field, ethnicity, gender, and
age. The baseline of the regression is female from the Netherlands, with undeclared ethnicity,
with field of study being not economics or related fields (see Table B3 for details). Wald tests
indicate that subjects in the US and Italy are more rule-following than Dutch subjects. All other
country comparisons are insignificant. And, consistent with our observations in Kimbrough and
Vostroknutov (2016), males are more rule-breaking.
1See Table B3 for the classification of fields of study and nationalities.
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Rule Following
β Std.Err.
Economics/Business –0.027 (0.023)
“American” 0.142 (0.261)
“Canadian” 0.150 (0.257)
White 0.165 (0.261)
Hispanic 0.249 (0.267)
Black 0.099 (0.267)
Asian 0.135 (0.255)
Male –0.090*** (0.023)
Age 0.002 (0.003)
USA 0.156** (0.069)
Canada 0.119 (0.078)
Turkey 0.100 (0.077)
Italy 0.144** (0.068)
Constant 0.309 (0.273)
N 1,090
Table B2: OLS regression of the rule following propensity. Errors are robust. * – p < 0.1; ** –
p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
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Field of Study Definition
Economics (baseline) Economics, finance, business, international business, business
economics, accounting, marketing, econometrics (and operations
research), human decision sciences, supply chain management,
banking, actuarial, economics and psychology, business and psy-
chology, human resource management, public administration
Social Sciences Psychology, sociology, cognitive science, hospitality management,
anthropology, law, political science
Arts & Humanities Arts, journalism, University College Maastricht, music, languages,
european studies, architecture, sports studies, higher education, in-
ternational relations, apparel studies, history, geography
Natural Sciences Computer science, informational systems, biology, animal science,
environmental sciences, engineering of all types, (bio)chemistry,
physics, mathematics, biomedical research, health sciences, com-
munication disorders, kinesiology, dietetics, nutrition studies,
nursing
Ethnicity Definition
N/A (baseline) Not specified
“American” Ethnicity specified as “American”
“Canadian” Ethnicity specified as “Canadian”
White All White Europeans including Spanish and Portuguese, Caucasian
or white Americans and Canadians
Hispanic All Spanish (Portuguese) speaking non-Europeans (Latin and
Southern America)
Black African Americans, African Canadians and Africans
Asian All nations from Middle East and Asia and Native Americans
Table B3: Classification of fields of study and ethnicities.
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C Instructions
C.1 RF Task Instructions
General information You are now participating in a decision making experiment. If you fol-
low the instructions carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money depending on your
decisions and the decisions of the other participants. Your earnings will be paid to you in CASH
at the end of the experiment
This set of instructions is for your private use only. During the experiment you are not allowed
to communicate with anybody. In case of questions, please raise your hand. Then we will come
to you and answer your questions privately. Any violation of this rule excludes you immediately
from the experiment.
Part I In Part I of this experiment, you will decide how to allocate 100 [50] balls between two
buckets.
Your task is to put each of the balls, one-by-one, into one of the two buckets: the blue bucket or
the yellow bucket. The balls will appear in the center of your screen, and you can allocate each
ball by clicking and dragging it to the bucket of your choice. For each ball you put in the blue
bucket, you will receive 5 cents, and for each ball you put in the yellow bucket, you will receive
10 cents.
The rule is to put the balls in the blue bucket.
Once the experiment begins, you will have 10 minutes to put the balls into the buckets. When
you are finished, please wait quietly until the end of the 10-minute period.
Your payment from Part I will be based on your decisions: it is the sum of payments from the
blue and yellow buckets.
This is the end of the instructions for Part I. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and
an experimenter will answer them privately. Otherwise, please wait quietly for the experiment
to begin.
5
C.2 DG Instructions (USA)
C.3 Norm Elicitation Instructions (USA)
6
7
8
